Kenneth Rapoza on the Chinese Property Market
The potential for a property market bubble
developing in China is a complex but important issue, making Kenneth Rapoza’s
choice to cover the subject pertinent. This essay will analyse two articles from
the key 2011-2013 period, considering elements of content and structure. It
will be shown that, while there are difficulties in establishing a causal link
between the two, there is a discernable thematic development from a situation of
potential danger in 2011 to relative stability in 2013, which Rapoza attributes
to the actions of the Chinese government; additionally, it will be argued that,
although Rapoza takes into account many of the key issues regarding the
property market in China, his failure to recognize the role of State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs from here) makes his conclusions potentially over-optimistic.
It will be necessary then, to establish the key elements of content and
structure from the 2011 and 2013 articles and to compare them. Once the
overarching narrative has been established, the role of SOEs will be
characterized within the context of Rapoza’s articles.
Kenneth Rapoza’s 2011 article, ‘Why China’s
housing bubble is different,’ and his 2013 article ‘China’s non-bubble housing
bubble,’ describe the “overheated property market” in China. An overheated market is one in which high
levels of growth are likely to cause inflation—a rapid increase in prices
(Smullen & Hand 2005, p. 299). At the extreme end, this rise in prices can
cause a speculative bubble, where the cost of assets becomes
much higher than their actual value (Smullen & Hand 2005, p. 50). The
prospect of a housing bubble in China is a key issue because China’s continued
growth is increasingly important to the global economy (Barkham R 2012, p. 175),
and the property sector is an inexorable part of that growth (Chen & Funke
2013, p. 39). Additionally, as Rapoza points out, an inflated property market
was one of the root causes of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC from here),
making many experts vigilant for signs of a similar situation developing in
China.
Rapoza’s 2011 article, then, addresses a key
issue within the economical field; however, before examining its content, it
will be useful to consider the way it is structured. In general, the article is
comprehensive but loosely structured, moving from commentary on the development
of the Chinese’s property market, to potential dangers to stability and growth
and, finally, to mitigating circumstances that make China’s situation different,
with particular emphasis on comparison with the US. This comparison is—again
somewhat loosely—sustained throughout the article. Rapoza’s narrative utilizes
a mixture of his own views, those of experts, and figures from the National
Bureau of Statistics in China. These structural arrangements create a complex
and uncertain picture, which, while making the author’s perspective difficult
to discern, actually agrees with its subject, which will now be analyzed.
The key elements of Rapoza’s 2011 article’s
content can be summarized as, (1) the nature of the overheating property market
and its causes, (2) the government’s response to the situation, (3) extra
information that makes China’s situation unique. Firstly, Rapoza’s article describes
the situation in China’s property market. The growth, he explains, is market
wide and particularly strong in large coastal cities. Rapoza attributes this
growth to foreign investment, low interest rates, the low Chinese dollar, and
China’s economy-wide growth. Secondly, the article discusses contemporaneous
attempts by the Chinese government to “cool” the market. These measures include
raising interest rates, lifting down payments on purchases and trialing a new real
estate tax. Finally, Rapoza describes some of the circumstances that are unique
to China, with a particular emphasis on comparison with the US. These include perceived
positive differences, like the Chinese people’s proclivity for saving, the
stability of the Chinese banking sector and the government’s willingness to regulate
the market, as well as negative factors like the dangers posed by diminishing
growth and the overreliance of the Chinese economy upon “big banks, big
enterprises and big government”(Jianmao in Rapoza, 2011). This, then, is
broadly the situation described in Rapoza’s 2011 article.
Rapoza’s 2013 article, ‘China’s non-bubble
housing bubble,’ describes the Chinese housing
market, which, while still strong, has cooled significantly. Again, this
article mixes the author’s own voice with those of experts and utilizes the
China-US comparison. Its structure is very loose, and lacks the comprehensive
and nuanced perspective of the first article. The first third covers the “cyclical
downturn” created by the Chinese government, implicitly endorsing these efforts.
The second considers a recent increase in activity and positions
overdevelopment in central China as a potential difficulty in the future. The
final third discusses Shanghai’s housing market and relates very little to the
central theme of the potential housing bubble. This is the basic structure and
content of the second article, which will now be compared with the first with a
view to establishing the author’s overall perspective; but first, it is
necessary to outline some of the difficulties inherit with such a comparison.
There are some difficulties in trying to
establish the causal relationship between the first and second articles that
the question implies. As has been shown, the articles are differently
constructed and cover slightly different subjects; the second article deals
specifically with the housing market
not the larger property market of the first article. Indeed, in
the second article, Rapoza also veers into discussion of the broader Asian
housing market. Furthermore, the first article’s pattern of describing the
situation then proposing potential problems, solutions and mitigating
circumstances, while comprehensive, means that a clear “situation” is not
easily discerned. This is less true of the second article, but the situation
Rapoza aims to illustrate is still not clear, particularly due to the
irrelevance of the final third. Despite these problems, when the structure and
content of the articles are closely compared, an overarching narrative does emerge.
Between the two articles there is a discernable
shift in the position of the author. Rapoza’s overarching narrative can be
broadly described as: a complex and potentially dangerous situation in 2011,
becoming a relatively stable one in 2013, through the agency of the Chinese
government. Most obviously the titles of the articles indicate this. However,
caution should be exercised in this, as the titles do not precisely reflect the
articles’ content. For example, the first article isn’t actually describing a
property bubble but an “overheated market” instead. By contrast, where the
titles are ambiguous, the structure and tone of the articles create a clear
indication of the author’s intent. In the first article these elements create a
sense of uncertainty. While the article’s comprehensive nature and the inherent
balance in Rapoza’s method mean that a clear situation is not easily discerned,
the complexity described, combined with the intermittent statement of potential
dangers, creates an implicit sense that the market is at risk. These elements are
largely missing from the second article, where Rapoza instead positions the Chinese
government as the active rescuer of the market. He uses verbs like “engineering”
(a cyclical downturn), “actively trying to pop” (the housing bubble) and “deciding
to do something” (about the problem) to demonstrate this (Rapoza 2013). When
the potential risk of over-development is mentioned it is within the context of
governmental control and is quickly disarmed. The nuance of the first article
and the complexity and risk described are thus largely replaced by governmental
action. This development is also noticeable when the use of the China-US
comparison is observed. In the 2011 article, the effect of the comparison is to
remind the reader of the US housing bubble and subsequent GFC, positioning the
Chinese situation within this context; most significantly, this occurs at the
start and end of the article, framing the entire discussion within these
parameters. In the 2013 article, by contrast, Rapoza uses the China-US
comparison to emphasize the success of the Chinese government in curtailing
dangerous growth. This, then, is the development of the situation as described
by Rapoza and how he establishes it, but are there factors, particularly in the
second, more optimistic article, that he has missed?
While possessing considerable limitations, Rapoza’s
two articles do help to illustrate the degree of control the Chinese government
has over their economy. Because of their pragmatic approach to regulation, they
are able to steer the economy away from potential dangers, such as the spike in
property prices described by Rapoza. However, the Chinese government is not
simply the regulator of the market, it is also a key investor. Through its SOEs
the Chinese government, on both a national and local level, owns a controlling
share of many key businesses, including banks and construction companies. Although
Rapoza mentions SOEs within the context of the banking sector, he fails to
indicate the level of government ownership in the construction industry. This
is key as the SOEs involved in the property market are one of the potential causes
of rising prices. However, before demonstrating this point, it is worthwhile
considering how SOEs have evolved to this position.
State Owned Enterprises are a legacy of the
communist era. During this time, they formed a basic unit of production and
distribution, not only employing people in construction and manufacturing but
also providing housing and other forms of welfare (Zhang & Rasiah 2014, p. 61).
Their role has altered significantly in the reform era. SOEs have been granted
increased autonomy to act as agents within the market (Hou 2011, p. 03). Additionally, a process of consolidation has
occurred whereby the SOEs have become larger and more specialized. Control over
most of these SOEs has been handed to local governments; however, the central
government maintains control over 129 SOEs operating in nationally important
industries. This process has resulted in the creation of massive, state owned
companies, which balance both private (profit) and public (welfare) interests. Significantly,
this means that these largely autonomous SOEs, with both public welfare and
profit accumulation motives, have an historical interest in real estate. This
has translated to market involvement in the reform era, with 94 of the 129
centrally controlled SOEs, actively involved in real estate (Zhang & Rasiah
2014, p. 58-68). But what role do they
play, and what effect does this have on the property market?
Since 1998, when the Chinese property market
was effectively privatized, SOEs have functioned as property developers and
speculators. They operate predominantly by leasing land from local governments,
developing large estates and then selling them to private individuals (Zhang
& Rasiah 2014, p. 64). This process has enabled SOEs to make enormous
profits. Although this seems to be a positive development for the Chinese
government and economy, there are also problems associated with the rise of
SOEs. For example, because of the strength of their position in the market, they
are able to make much higher bids for land than private developers. In Beijing,
for example, Wu et al. found that, between 2003 and 2010, SOEs paid 27% higher
prices for land than private investors (2012, p. 532). Of equal concern is the
reliance of local governments on the revenue stream coming from SOEs. Such a reliance,
when coupled with the vast sums of money involved, makes the risk of collusion
and corrupt practices extremely high. Additionally, as the government owns controlling
shares of the SOEs there is an inherent moral
hazard in these practices. Moral hazard is a situation where an incentive
to engage in immoral or overly risky economic behavior exists because of the
assurance of protection (Smullen & Hand 2005, p. 270). For instance, in
this example, the SOEs are paying prices well above market value under the
aegis of the Chinese government, knowing that if the market were to drop
suddenly it would be in the interest of the government, as investors, to bail them
out.
The overall effect of SOEs on the property
market is not fully understood and must be considered within the broader
dynamics of the Chinese economy. These issues feed into bigger questions as to
the role of government in the market place. One perspective is that the Chinese
government’s position is one of complete dominance. As Leo Goostadt, quoting
Professor David Shambaugh shows:
“While the state sector of
the economy has shrunk significantly (to approximately 30 percent of the
national economy)’, Professor David Shambaugh, a distinguished China specialist
has observed, ‘This is deceiving as the state remains the “invisible hand”
dominating the economy’. It maintains this control, he explained in an article
published in an official newspaper, ‘through state banks, state assets, state
ownership, state manipulated prices, state cadres and unpredictable state
intervention in various economic sectors” (Goodstadt 2011, p. 13).
This may well paint an overly pessimistic
and cynical picture. As has been demonstrated in this essay, and illustrated by
Rapoza in his two articles, there are many advantages that the Chinese posses
owning to government control of and involvement in the property market. Additionally,
many economists agree that in this instance large-scale market manipulation has
not caused a speculative bubble, and that, for the most part, the rise in
property prices can be attributed to fundamental factors within Chinese economy,
such as interest rates and economical growth (Xu & Chen, 2012 p. 74, Shen
2012, p. 1208). However, the fact remains that the risks of collusion,
corruption and moral hazard resulting from government involvement in the
market, and the full effects of these practices, are not yet fully understood.
It may well be, as Wu et al. argue, that SOEs are indeed partly responsible for
inflating the market (2012, p. 540). Certainly, this is an area in need of
further investigation and close scrutiny in the future, and, as such, something
that Rapoza should have considered.
The object of this essay has been to analyse
two articles from Kenneth Rapoza from 2011 and 2013, discussing China’s
property market, in an attempt to demonstrate the author’s perspective and to
consider any shortcomings in his analysis. It has been found that, despite the
difficulties in assessing the articles as a pair, there is a developing
narrative. Rapoza moves from concern over the stability of the market to a
position of surety and attributes this positive development to the Chinese
government’s actions. It has been demonstrated that Rapoza’s failure to
illustrate the role of SOEs in potentially inflating the market may make his
second article overly optimistic. In this process, this essay has touched on
some important issues regarding the property market in China, which, because of
China’s increasing economical importance, has global implications. Although
there is much doubt about the sustainability of China’s current growth model,
it is clear that this situation needs to be closely monitored in the future.
Reference
List
Primary
Sources
Rapoza, K 2011, ‘Why China’s housing bubble
is different’, Forbes, viewed 5 February
2014, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/04/22/why-chinas-property-bubble-is-different/>.
Rapoza, K 2013, ‘China’s non-bubble housing
bubble’, Forbes, viewed 5 February
2014, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/03/11/chinas-non-bubble-housing-bubble/>.
Secondary
Sources
Barkham, R 2012, Real Estate and Globalisation, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd,
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